Grid security

These activities include all hazards, steady-state preparation, and emergency preparedness, response, and recovery for the nation’s electricity sector.

Managed by NERC and the E-ISAC, the last GridEx (VII) took place in November 2025 and involved hundreds of organizations and thousands of participants from industry, government agencies, and partners in Canada and Mexico. The RMUC Program is authorized to appropriate a total of $250 million in grants and technical assistance over five years to rural, municipal, and small investor-owned electric utilities to enhance their security posture. CISA 2015 expired on September 30, 2025, but was temporarily reauthorized as part of a larger appropriations bill through September 30, 2026. The electric sector is unique in that it has long been subject to cyber incident reporting mandates to the Department of Energy (DOE) via an Electricity Emergency Incident and Disturbance Report (OE-417) and NERC/FERC. Members can communicate and share ideas, participate in discussion forums, send email blasts, create file libraries, organize conference calls, and keep track of important dates and upcoming events. The EEI Security Issue Community provides members with an online forum to facilitate policy development, information exchange and networking.

In 2016, members of the Russian hacker organization “Grizzly Steppe” infiltrated the computer system of a Vermont utility company, Burlington Electric, exposing the vulnerability of the nation’s electric grid to attacks. In his 2015 book, Ted Koppel argues that all utilities, but especially smaller ones, do not truly air-gap their operations from the internet, leaving significant attack surfaces. In the U.S., the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is in charge of the cybersecurity standards for the bulk power system.

Information Sharing and Protection

Reliable and affordable power will be necessary to support America’s reindustrialization and our national security. As the DoD moves away from vulnerable supply chains and embraces a diverse energy portfolio, the power and performance of the grid becomes increasingly essential. Currently, the DoD is the largest consumer of energy in the U.S. government, relying heavily on state and regional grids surrounding each installation to provide power for its operations. APPA is part of a coalition of critical infrastructure sectors advocating for the law’s long-term extension. It would also require that https://consultprofound.com/top-ai-trends-2024-key-developments-to-watch.html?noamp=mobile all agencies, including independent regulatory agencies, consult with the committee before issuing or updating regulations. The three primary segments of the electric utility industry—public power, investor-owned, and electric cooperatives—have long had in place mutual aid response networks to share employees and resources to restore power after natural disasters and other emergencies.

Cybersecurity

To address these potential hazards, the electric power industry is working hard to enhance the resilience of the energy grid, to mitigate the potential impact of an EMP, and to accelerate recovery from potential incidents. The energy grid is a complex, interconnected network of generation, transmission, distribution, control, and communication technologies, which can be damaged by natural events—such as severe storms—and by malicious events, such as cyber and physical attacks. Reliable electricity powers essential defense operations including manufacturing, supply distribution, communication, command and control, and intelligence, which are critical to the success of U.S. military missions. The attack, in which gunmen fired on 17 electrical transformers, resulted in more than $15 million worth of equipment damage, but it had little impact on the station’s electrical power supply. Danielle has worked extensively on transmission expansion for national security and overall grid security and resilience planning.

• This research helps us to make scientifically informed investment decisions for mitigation measures and to identify ways to leverage existing response and recovery programs and capabilities.
• CISA 2015 expired on September 30, 2025, but was temporarily reauthorized as part of a larger appropriations bill through September 30, 2026.
• In early 2026, APPA was awarded another $2 million to launch a new program, Response Beacon, to enhance the cyber incident response capabilities of its members.
• On April 16, 2013, an attack was carried out on Pacific Gas and Electric Company’s Metcalf transmission substation in Coyote, California, near the border of San Jose.
• Duke Energy put together a corporate incident response team that is devoted to cybersecurity 24 hours a day.
• Similar to other new technologies, the smart grid also introduces new security concerns.

• In 2016, members of the Russian hacker organization “Grizzly Steppe” infiltrated the computer system of a Vermont utility company, Burlington Electric, exposing the vulnerability of the nation’s electric grid to attacks.
• Danielle has worked extensively on transmission expansion for national security and overall grid security and resilience planning.
• The load (demand for electricity) and capacity (supply of electricity) must be kept in near perfect balance for the electrical grid to function.
• The latest on NHI and Agentic AI security – articles, research, breaches, news and events every week.
• Reliable electricity powers essential defense operations including manufacturing, supply distribution, communication, command and control, and intelligence, which are critical to the success of U.S. military missions.

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reports that cyber attacks on the electric grid system are increasing in both frequency and sophistication. Assailants who were never apprehended attacked the Pacific Gas and Electric Metcalf substation with automatic rifle fire on the night of 16 April 2013. While the damage would not be nearly as devastating or widespread as that of a nuclear EMP, the ease of acquiring and assembling parts means that terrorists have a relatively easy way to cause significant damage to local communities. This is referred to as a cascading power failure when substations fail. If a substation goes off line, the electricity flows to the next substation which can cause an imbalance (i.e. an overage) in that substation, as so on and so forth across vast distances.

First, hackers have become more sophisticated in their attempts to disrupt electric grids. In a report concerning extremist threats, the Department of Homeland Security made note of a Telegram document that gave instructions for low-tech sabotage, including attacks on electrical power stations with rifles. Since 2014, vandalism and confirmed or suspected physical attacks on electrical grid infrastructure have also been the second-largest cause of electrical disturbance events. The North American electrical power grid is a highly connected system. Government officials have expressed concern with the possibility of violent extremists and agents of foreign states attacking the nation’s electrical grid.

Whether it’s a one-off risk assessment or comprehensive managed security services and network operations, our diverse skill sets and toolkits are at your disposal. Our story is one of collaboration and dedication, with a tight-knit team working together seamlessly to tackle the ever-evolving challenges of the energy grid. Were such a solar storm to strike Earth today, the damage would be in the trillions of dollars, but worse yet, societies all over the world would be devastated.

In the 2010s and 2020s, attacks to the United States electrical grid have become more frequent, with 2022 being the year with the most attacks. As an example, one risk specifically comes from the integration of digital communications and computer infrastructure with the existing physical infrastructure of the power grid. From the 2000s through to the 2020s, the security of the U.S. electrical grid has come into question. The industry partners with the federal government, particularly the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, and federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies.

The ESCC serves as the principal liaison between the federal government and the electric power sector, with the mission of coordinating efforts to prepare for, and respond to, national-level disasters or threats to critical infrastructure. Moreover, there is robust electric utility industry participation in information sharing organizations known as the Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center (E-ISAC) and the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center. This research helps us to make scientifically informed investment decisions for mitigation measures and to identify ways to leverage existing response and recovery programs and capabilities.

Model Procurement Contract Language Addressing Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk

We hope to propel the future of global energy by delivering scalable and effective managed network operations and security services for inverter-based generators and control centers. Our primary focus is specializing in inverter-based resources like solar, wind, and battery storage, alongside their control centers, so we intimately understand your operations. Siemens grid cybersecurity products are developed and designed with continuous improvement processes and measurable quality goals along the entire development lifecycle.

Danielle Russo is an innovative leader and policy expert focused on aligning energy programs and policy with national interests. SAFE’s Center for Grid Security provides policy analysis and recommendations to build out the national power grid – ensuring America’s energy and national security. As noted above, CISA 2015 set up policies and procedures for the voluntary sharing of cybersecurity threat information between and among the federal government and https://canisciolti.info/the-5-commandments-of-and-how-learn-more/ private entities and provided limited liability protection for these activities.